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SPITE: LEGAL AND SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS 
by 
Jeffrey L. Harrison* 
Spite is not a simple concept. Spiteful actions may be motivated by a 
desire to harm others as a source of the actor’s satisfaction. They may also 
be a reaction to a personal sense of injustice. Finally, spite-like actions 
are consistent with simply righting a wrong. This Article makes the case 
that spite, in its worst from, is comparably to theft. It is a taking of 
someone’s sense of well-being without consent. It also claims that the 
purchase of positional goods is ultimately spite driven. It canvasses tort 
law, contracts, tax law, trademark, and criminal law in an effort to 
assess the reaction of the law to spite. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
You are driving in your car on a four-lane road. Maybe the windows 
are down and the radio is up high. You pull into the outside lane to pass 
a slower car and just as you are side by side with that car, someone drives 
up behind you, way too close. You are annoyed and you ease your foot off 
the gas or maybe even tap the brake ever so slightly. The tailgating driver 
has to brake to avoid running into you. Why did you do that? Spite is the 
most likely answer. Spite is “a . . . desire to harm, annoy, frustrate, or 
humiliate another person.”1 The key word here is “desire” as in having a 
preference. In effect, the spiteful person enjoys a boost in utility or some 
other measure of pleasure from having a negative impact on others.2 
The braking driver is but one example of spiteful behavior. Spite 
actually explains a great deal of behavior and law. In varying degrees, 
examples are found in tax,3 tort,4 contracts,5 criminal law,6 and property.7 
Arguably even political actions with broad implications can be motivated 
by spite.8 This Article is about spite and focuses on how the law reacts to 
spite. Section II begins by defining spite more specifically and then 
examines the explanation for spiteful behavior. It makes the case that 
spiteful actions are a special kind of theft—they involve taking from 
others without consent. On the other hand, like the detractors in the 
 
1 WEBSTER’S NEW UNIVERSAL UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 1840 (1996). 
2 In more economic terms the parties have interdependent utility functions. As 
the subject of spiteful behavior had a decrease in utility, the utility of the spiteful 
person increases.  
3  John Cullis et al., ‘Spite Effects’ in Tax Evasion Experiments, 41 J. SOCIO. ECON. 
418, 418 (2012). 
4 RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 207 (6th ed. 2003). 
5 In contract law, duress occurs when there is an improper threat. Under the 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, one example of improper threat is when “the 
threatened act would harm the recipient and would not significantly benefit the party 
making the threat.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176 (2)(a) (AM. LAW 
INST. 1979).  
6 One of the standard justifications for punishment in the criminal law context is 
retribution. Punishment, however, is expensive, and in the case of retribution, the 
benefits to those meting it out is merely psychic. 
7 People buy what are referred to as “positional goods” as a way of raising their 
status relative to others. Thus, part of the motivation for buying positional or status 
goods is the demotion of the rank or status of others. See also Larissa Katz, Spite and 
Extortion: A Jurisprudential Principle of Abuse of Property, 122 YALE L.J. 1444, 1446–47 
(2013). 
8 At least one theory is that the actions of President Trump are motivated by a 
spiteful reaction to President Obama. Paul Krugman, Trump Gratuitously Rejects the 
Paris Climate Accord, N.Y. TIMES (June 1, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/06/01/opinion/trump-gratuitously-rejects-the-paris-climate-accord.html?_r=0; Bill 
Palmer, Donald Trump Damaged Himself Badly Today by Trying to Spite President Obama, 
(June 1, 2017), http://www.palmerreport.com/opinion/harmed-trump-obama/3227/.  
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well-known ultimatum game,9 spiteful-like behavior may be the product 
of justice-seeking.10 In this sense, perhaps actions that appear spiteful are 
actually not self-regarding but have deontological significance in that the 
detractor acts out of sense of duty. Consequently, a distinction is made 
between spite as commonly understood and actions that are similar but 
based on principle. Section II also explains why the purchase of 
“positional goods”11 is ultimately spiteful. Section III is a survey of the law 
of spite. The question is whether law takes a consistent view of spite and, 
if it does not, if there is some underlying principle that explains the 
inconsistency. More specifically, are spiteful people treated like thieves? 
This research has a quantitative and a qualitative component. The 
conclusion is that criminal and tort law are, to some extent, designed to 
decrease spite. Other areas of law are largely neutral, except for 
trademark, which actually subsidizes spite. Generally, the law is not 
nuanced sufficiently to distinguish self-regarding spite from spitefulness 
that may be socially beneficial. 
A final note is in order. Much of what is printed in law reviews is 
advocacy. The author has a point of view or a position to advance. There 
are questions about whether advocacy or “normative scholarship” actually 
is scholarship.12 In either case it can be valuable. The analysis that follows 
reflects a different sort of effort. It begins with no agenda nor any 
preconception of where the research would go. The goal is to achieve an 
understanding of these rarely discussed matters and to assess the position 
of American law.  
II.  FOCUSING ON SPITE 
A. What is Spite? 
Spiteful actions are characterized by two necessary conditions. First, 
spite comes at a cost to the spiteful person. It is important to note that 
the cost is material and not, on balance, psychic. In fact, the net expected 
psychic benefit is positive; otherwise, the spiteful actions, barring 
irrationality, would not occur. They do occur as long as the utility derived 
 
9 See infra text accompanying notes 29–32. 
10 See infra text accompanying notes 31–33. Briefly, the game involves two players, 
one of whom is the controller. The controller is given a sum of money, which he or 
she may keep as long as he or she gets the permission of the other player. This means 
the controller can offer the other player none or some portion of the sum. There is 
only one try and, if the other player accepts the offer, both parties keep their shares. 
If the other player declines, both players leave empty-handed.  
11 Positional goods are “those things whose value depends relatively strongly on 
how they compare with things owned by others.” Robert Frank, The Demand for 
Unobservable and Other Nonpositional Goods, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 101, 101 (1985). 
12 See Robin West, The Contested Value of Normative Legal Scholarship, 66 J. LEGal 
EDUC. 6, 9 (2016). 
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from the perceived harm to someone else is greater than the disutility of 
the spiteful action. For example, in the case of the brake tapper 
described at the outset, the action delays the actor’s progress, but the 
hope is that the inconvenience is more than offset by the harm to the 
tailgater. Thus, it is probably incorrect to view spite as irrational, 
although the outcome may appear that way if the spiteful person makes 
an incorrect judgment.13 Second, the pleasure or utility derived from 
spite is exclusively a function of the expected disutility, pain, or 
discomfort of the target of the spiteful conduct. This does not mean that 
spite is the only reason for the spiteful person’s actions. For example, in 
the conventional case of what are called “spite fences,” the builder of the 
fence may actually enjoy the privacy the fence affords without regard for 
the impact on others. In addition, there may be satisfaction from 
knowing a disliked neighbor will not be able to enjoy the view of forest or 
beach. The key is that at least part of the motivation for the action is 
based on interdependent utility functions. 
Spite is distinguishable from other actions that harm others.14 For 
example, in negligence, the harm is typically the result of one party 
attempting to save money by not taking preventive measures. The money 
saver in the case of negligence would just as soon desire that the harmed 
party not be harmed. They derive no independent pleasure from the 
harm of another. In contract law, the harm to a non-breaching party is a 
direct result of the benefits the breaching party seeks. Again, though, a 
contract breaching party causes harm but is not motivated by a desire to 
cause harm. The spiteful person’s satisfaction, on the other hand, occurs 
because someone is worse off. 
These factors also explain the difference between spite and 
schadenfreude. They are similar in that they involve deriving pleasure from 
the misfortune of others. They differ in an important way that has 
implications for the law. For the most part, in the case of schadenfreude, 
the pleasure is a windfall. The person finding pleasure in the bad luck or 
poor decision making of another may not play any role in bringing the 
events about that lead to the unpleasantness. 
It also makes sense to distinguish spite from hate and envy. Envy 
does not necessarily lead to action designed to harm the subject of that 
envy. Envy can result in spiteful actions, but this is most likely to occur 
when accompanied by a sense of injustice. 15 Much the same is true of 
hate. Extreme dislike of someone or something does not mean taking 
actions to make the subject of that hate worse off. Hate crimes, on the 
 
13 This would occur if the target of the spiteful action actually did not care.  
14 A variety of definitions are found in David K. Marcus et al., The Psychology of 
Spite and the Measurement of Spitefulness, 26 PSYCHOL. ASSESSMENT 1, 2 (2014). 
15 Rawls classifies envy as a non-moral feeling that is not to be confused with 
resentment, which is a moral feeling in that it is driven by a sense of injustice. JOHN 
RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 533 (1971). 
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other hand, present a special case and are spiteful because they join hate 
with actual action. In fact, they might be more accurately labeled as “spite 
crimes.” In a sense, spiteful actions can be regarded as mini hate crimes; 
they do not reveal hatred for a group or a class of people, but the 
willingness to make oneself materially worse off in order to make 
someone else worse off represents the same dynamic as in ordinary hate 
crimes.  
The most difficult distinction is between spite and malice. In fact, the 
distinction may be impossible because to some they are synonyms. 
Nevertheless psychologists, sociologists, and courts16 seem to have a 
separate category for spite. It is true that malicious people derive 
pleasure from harming others and this is shared by those who act 
spitefully. Spite, though, implies a more direct and perhaps intimate 
target. The spiteful person does not derive pleasure from harming just 
anyone. Instead, when people act out of spite they are more likely to have 
a specific target in mind and that target is someone or some group that 
must be “put in their place.” To some extent law gets to this distinction 
by distinguishing actual malice and legal malice. Actual malice denotes 
spite or ill will while legal malice is more in line with reckless disregard.17 
It is important not to confuse spite with retaliation. For example, 
there are many cases dealing with retaliatory discharge. People are 
terminated for reasons that seem unfair. Nevertheless, retaliation is often 
not to the detriment of those in power. An employer who fires an 
employee for taking time off for jury duty may desire to discourage 
others from doing the same. In fact, although the employer may lose the 
productive worker, the net outcome may be perceived to result in net 
material gain. Of course, some terminations do appear to be spiteful or 
vindictive. In an important case dealing with a terminable-at-will 
employee, Monge v. Beebe,18 a female employee was terminated after 
repeatedly declining social advances of her supervisor. There the act of 
terminating a productive employee seems motivated by spite rather than 
by an effort to affect the behavior of the work force.  
Spite as defined here is fundamentally utilitarian and, as noted, 
depends on interdependent utility functions. One person hurts another 
because it makes the first person feel better off. It is possible, though, 
that what appears to be spiteful actions are not utilitarian at all. This idea 
 
16 Courts have held that a showing of legal malice does not require ill-will or 
spite. See, e.g., Macquarie Bank Ltd. v. Knickel, 793 F.3d 926, 940 (8th Cir. 2015); 
Remmick v. Mills, 165 N.W.2d 61, 71 (N.D. 1968). 
17 Bocek v. JGA Assoc., LLC, No 1:111-cv-0546, 2016 WL 1161401 at *13 (E.D. Va. 
Mar. 23, 2016); Molina v. Jiffy Lube Intern., Inc. No. 07-22644-CIV 2008, WL 4541025 
at *7 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 8, 2008); Preyer v. Dartmouth Coll., 968 F. Supp. 20, 26 (D. N.H. 
1997).  
18 Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 316 A.2d 549, 551 (N.H. 1974). 
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will be returned to later,19 but consider the brake tapping driver, the 
detractor from the ultimatum game, and punishment in the context of 
criminal law. All three can have a utilitarian basis—pleasure is derived 
from harm to another. On the other hand, it is possible for the 
motivation to be more rules-driven or corrective,20 rather than utility 
maximizing, and the party responding gets no satisfaction but feels duty-
bound to right the wrong. It is impossible to know when actions that 
seem spiteful are actually consistent with the self-regarding motivations 
or the perhaps a more benign sense of moral obligation.  
B. “Spite” as Justice Seeking 
Spite has a bad name. The idea of harming others is hard to support 
from any perspective. In fact, one author labels spite “altruism’s evil 
twin.”21 The idea is that altruism and spite are both motivated by the 
desire to increase one’s own utility. Altruism means doing it by perceiving 
oneself as having made others better off. Spite accomplishes that greater 
sense of well-being by seeming to make others worse off. This may put 
spite in an unfair negative light. Spite is often, and maybe most of the 
time, motivated by a sense of unfairness or injustice.22 Whether that sense 
is legitimate or not is another question. 
The implications of a sense of unfairness are illustrated by “equity 
theory” which explains why people act differently toward different 
distributive outcomes.23 Different distributions will be seen as fair as long 
as the following equation holds: 
outcomes of person A/inputs of person A = outcomes of person B/inputs of person B 
The theory allows for different distributive outcomes to be viewed as 
fair as long as those favored or disfavored feel the proportions of 
outcomes to inputs are the same. On the other hand, in a typical case, 
person B may feel his or her ratio of outcomes to inputs is 1/3 while that 
of person A is 1/2. There are a number of ways to return to what is 
 
19 See infra text accompanying notes 33–38. 
20 This is true in the case of retribution as a purpose of punishment. See infra text 
accompanying notes 33–38. 
21 W.L. Vickery et al., Spite: Altruism’s Evil Twin, 102 OIKOS 413, 413 (2003). 
22 For example, tax evasion efforts are more pronounced when there is the 
perception that the system is unfair. See Cullis, et al. supra note 3, at 423.  
23 Equity theory seems to have originated by J. Stacy Adams. See J. Stacy Adams, 
Inequity in Social Exchange, in 2 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 267, 
268 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1965); J. Stacy Adams, Toward an Understanding of 
Inequity, 67 J. ABNORMAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 422, 422 (1963); see also Elaine Walster et al., 
New Directions in Equity Research, in 9 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1, 
1 (Leonard Berkowitz & Elaine Walster eds., 1976); Peter Shabad, Giving the Devil His 
Due: Spite and the Struggle for Individual Dignity, 17 PSYCHOANALYTICAL PSYCHOL. 690, 
691 (2000).  
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perceived to be an equitable outcome.24 For example, in an employment 
situation, B could reduce his or her efforts.25 Alternatively, B could take 
steps to reduce the outcomes of person A. Either one could make the 
sides of the equation equal.  
Perhaps the best example of spite in operation is found in behavioral 
economics and experiments involving the ultimatum game. In this two-
party game a controller is appointed and a sum of money allocated to the 
parties.26 The parties cannot communicate. It is an ultimatum game 
because the controller (A) gets one opportunity to offer his or her 
counterpart (B) a portion of the money. If he or she accepts the offer, 
the parties keep the money. If he or she rejects the offer, neither party 
keeps any portion of the money. The question is how much A should 
offer. Traditionally, economic theory would indicate that if both parties 
are rational, the controller should offer nothing or a very small share.27 
The idea is that B is better off28 with even a small share and to reject the 
offer would mean being worse off.  
Repeated experiments with the game indicate that this is not the 
usual outcome.29 For example, suppose the controller is given $10. In 
 
24 See Paul D. Sweeny, Distributive Justice and Pay Satisfaction: A Field Test of an Equity 
Theory Prediction, 4 J. BUS. PSYCHOL. 329, 335 (1990). 
25 See J. Stacy Adams & Sara Freedman, Equity Theory Revisited: Comments and 
Annotated Bibliography, in 9 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 43, 47 
(Leonard Berkowitz & Elaine Walster eds., 1976); J. Stacy Adams & William B. 
Rosenbaum, The Relationship of Worker Productivity to Cognitive Dissonance About Wage 
Inequities, 46 J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 161, 161–62 (1962); Maurice E. Schweitzer & Donald 
E. Gibson, Fairness, Feelings, and Ethical Decision-Making: Consequences of Violating 
Community Standards of Fairness, 77 J. BUS. ETHICS 287, 291 (2008); see also Keith 
Jensen, Punishment and Spite: The Dark Side of Cooperation, 365 PHILOS. TRANSACTIONS 
ROYAL SOC. BIOLOGICAL SCI. 2635, 2643 (2010).  
26 See Shmuel Zamir, Rationality and Emotions in Ultimatum Bargaining, 61 ANNALES 
D’ECONOMIE ET DE STATISTIQUE 1, 2 (2001); Madan M. Pillutla & J. Keith Murnighan, 
Unfairnesss, Anger, and Spite: Emotional Rejections of Ultimatum Offers, 68 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. HUM. DECIS. PROCESS. 208, 220 (1996); Werner Güth et al., 
An Experimental Analysis of Ultimatum Bargaining, 3 J. ECON. BEHAV. ORGAN. 367, 367 
(1982). See generally COLIN F. CAMERER, BEHAVIORAL GAME THEORY–EXPERIMENTS IN 
STRATEGIC INTERACTION 44 (2003).  
27 Güth et al., supra note 26, at 372. 
28 Or B is no worse off if B is offered nothing.  
29 Alan G. Sanfey et al., The Neural Basis of Economic Decision-Making in the 
Ultimatum Game, 300 SCI. 1755, 1755 (2003); see also Richard H. Thaler, Anomalies: The 
Ultimatum Game, J. ECON. PERSPECT., 195, 197 (1988); Daniel Kahneman et al., Fairness 
and the Assumptions of Economics, 59 J. BUS. S285, S285–86 (1986); Daniel Kahneman et 
al., Fairness as a Constraint on Profit Seeking: Entitlements in the Market, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 
728, 729–30 (1986). A similar theme is found in Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. 
Spitzer, The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests, 25  J. LAW ECON. 73, 95–96 (1982). 
See also Elizabeth Hoffman & Matthew L. Spitzer, Entitlements, Rights, and Fairness: An 
Experimental Examination of Subjects’ Concepts of Distributive Justice, 14 J. LEG. STUD. 259, 
259–60 (1985). See generally Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and 
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many instances, an offer of $0.10 or $1.00 is rejected. In effect, the small 
offer offends B, who would rather take nothing than experience what he 
or she perceives as an unfair outcome.30 This is consistent with equity 
theory in that the inputs of both participants are the same. Something 
other than an equal division is likely to seem unfair to B. B can bring 
equity back by making sure neither party is enriched.31 In effect, there is 
sacrifice to create a sense of fairness.32 It is also consistent with what we 
regard as spiteful behavior. B is willing to be worse off in order to also 
make A worse off. On the other hand, it cannot be ruled out that the 
person rejecting the offer has no real desire to make anyone worse off 
but is reacting to right the wrong of a stingy offer. This distinction cannot 
be determined, but it does suggest that what might be regarded as 
spiteful is not as self-regarding as it initially appears.  
When one views spite as a reaction to perceived unfairness—whether 
in the context of the ultimatum game or paying taxes33—the concept and 
the actions seem more defendable and less objectionable. Does this 
mean that every incident of spite is a case of reacting to a perceived 
unfairness? In many cases, it is. The driver who slows down as described 
at the outset of this Article usually regards the tailgating drivers as an 
advantage taker or at least someone who is not observing a norm. Even in 
instances of litigation34 or battles over child custody, the likelihood is that 
one party is willing to sacrifice as a means of rebalancing the equities as 
subjectively perceived. In effect, the party feeling a sense of unfairness—
whether motivated by self-interest or a sense of what is right or wrong—
attempts to make an informal adjustment to reestablish a sense of justice.  
Related to the possibility that spite or spite-like action is oftentimes 
motivated by informal fairness seeking is the idea, explored primarily by 
social scientists, that spite is an important factor in encouraging 
cooperation.35 People who act spitefully are punishers, and if that 
 
Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1490 (1998); Georg Kirchsteiger, The Role of Envy in 
Ultimatum Games, 25 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 373, 374 (1994); Matthew Rabin, 
Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics, 83 AM. ECON. REV. 1281, 1284 
(1993). 
30 One of the important aspects of the ultimatum game was that the outcome 
seemed to disprove the economic assumption that people were rational maximizers 
of self-interest. On the other hand, whether rejecting an offer is rational or not 
depends on how powerful a person’s sense of fairness is.  
31 This is not to say there must be an even division for the parties to agree.  
32 See generally Edna Ullmann-Margalit & Cass R. Sunstein, Inequality and 
Indignation, 30 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 337, 349 (2001). But see Armin Falk et al., Driving 
Forces Behind Informal Sanctions, 73 ECONOMETICA 2017, 2028 (2005). 
33 See Cullis, et al., supra note 3, at 423. 
34 Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of 
Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEG. STUD. 225, 239 (1982). 
35 F. W. Marlowe et al., The ‘Spiteful’ Origins of Human Cooperation, 278 PROC. 
ROYAL SOC’Y BIOLOGICAL 2159, 2163 (2011); Jensen, supra note 25, at 2644; Mark 
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punishment is wielded in particular ways, it can encourage the target to 
adhere to group norms.36 In effect, spiteful acts are costly to the actor and 
to the subject of spite but may accrue to the benefit of a group over the 
long run.37 One group of social scientists puts it broadly: “It is mainly 
[spite] that is relevant for understanding the origins of human 
cooperation.”38 
This may paint too rosy a picture of spite or its moral-based 
equivalent and an incomplete one. First, it is hard to square equity-
seeking spite with actions that seem purely motivated by cruelty or 
hatred. In cases of what might be called “pure spite,” individuals simply 
enjoy harming others even though that harm comes at a risk of harm or 
punishment.39 Second, it is important to note that a sense of unfairness is 
purely subjective and is highly dependent on factors such as self-esteem, a 
sense of entitlement, and social comparisons.40 In short, one should not 
be too quick to look favorably on the spiteful person because they may 
react to perceived unfairness. That sense may be based on an inflated 
sense of entitlement. In fact, consider the findings of one study with 
respect to the personality traits of spitefulness.41 Spite was found to be 
positively correlated with aggression, psychopathy, Machiavellianism, 
narcissism, and guilt-free shame.42 On the other hand, spite was 
negatively correlated with self-esteem, guilt proneness, agreeableness, 
and conscientiousness.43 Third, even if one takes a favorable view of spite 
as a means of advancing cooperation, it is important to note that 
cooperation in the abstract carries no particular moral connotation. The 
purposes of cooperation can range from helping the poor to attempting 
to remain undetected while fixing prices.  
 
Hauser et al., Evolving the Ingredients for Reciprocity and Spite, 364 PHIL. TRANSACTIONS 
ROYAL SOC.’Y BIOLOGICAL SCI. 3255, 3263 (2009); Samuael Bowles & Herbert Gintis, 
Social Preferences, Homo Economicus, and Zoon Politikon, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
CONTEXTUAL POLITICAL ANALYSIS 173 (Robert D. Goodin & Charles Tilly eds., 2006).  
36 Jensen, supra note 25, at 2644; ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF 
COOPERATION 85 (1984). 
37 Jensen, supra note 25, at 2644; Ernst Fehr & Urs Fischbacher, Social Norms and 
Human Cooperation, 8 TRENDS COGNITIVE SCI. 185, 189 (2004). 
38 Marlowe et al., supra note 35, at 2163. 
39 One example may be rape in which the rapist’s utility is a function of the lack 
of consent by the victim.  
40 Jeffrey L. Harrison, Class, Personality, Contract, and Unconscionability, 35 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 445, 456 (1994). 
41 Marcus et al., supra note 14, at 1. 
42 Id. 
43 Id.  
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C. Spite and Positional Goods 
Spite as analyzed here is probably under inclusive. If spite entails 
actions that make others worse off, then it is possible to include the 
purchase and possession of what economists call “positional goods” as 
spiteful. Positional goods are: “those things whose value depends 
relatively strongly on how they compare with things owned by others.”44 
In short, the appeal of these goods is not based on their usefulness but 
on their ability to signal the superiority of the purchaser.45 For the most 
part, those who write about positional spending are concerned with 
positional externalities—pressures on others to “keep up.”46 Economist 
Robert Frank, the leading commentator on positional spending, 
compares the effort to obtain position goods to a military arms race.47 In 
effect, neither country gains an advantage and each neglects spending on 
goods and services that satisfy other needs.48 The analogy is valid but does 
not sufficiently emphasize the point that in the context of consumer 
goods the “winners” actually decrease the status and perceived well-being 
of those less affluent. Lifting the status of the purchaser means lowering 
the relative status of those who cannot afford the same goods. Jon Elster 
captures this idea when he describes unethical preferences: “[T]hese 
would include spiteful and sadistic preferences, and arguably also the 
desire for positional goods, i.e. goods such that it is logically impossible 
for more than a few to have them.”49 
This is not to say all motivations for purchasing luxury goods are 
related to their positional quality. They may, in fact, have qualities that 
are attractive to the buyer regardless of the impact on others. 
Nevertheless, in some instances people protect their relatively higher 
status or attempt to establish it by the consumption of goods that are 
unavailable to others. The more expensive the good, the more likely this 
is to be true. Accordingly, the non-neutral effect of consuming these 
goods is noted by Ugo Pagano, who observes that “if an individual i 
 
44 Frank, supra note 11, at 101; see also Fredrik Carlsson et al., Do You Enjoy Having 
More than Others? Survey Evidence of Positional Goods, 74 ECONOMICA 586, 586 (2007); 
Robert Frank, Should Public Policy Respond to Positional Externalities?, 92 J. PUB. ECON. 
1777, 1778 (2008); FRED HIRSCH, SOCIAL LIMITS TO GROWTH 27–28 (1976). 
45 See generally Robert Frank, Positional Externalities Cause Large and Preventable 
Welfare Loses, 95 AM. ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 137, 137 (2005). See also Roger Mason, 
Conspicuous Consumption and the Positional Economy: Policy and Prescription Since 1970, 21 
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 123, 123 (2000).  
46 Xavier Landes, Why Taxing Consumption?, in 40 IUS GENTIUM 101, 103 
(Mortimer Sellers & James Maxeiner eds., 2015). See also Thomas D. Griffith, 
Progressive Taxation and Happiness, 45 B.C. L. REV. 1363, 1384 (2004). 
47 Frank, supra note 44, at 1777. 
48 Id. at 1778. 
49 JON ELSTER, SOUR GRAPES: STUDIES IN THE SUBVERSION OF RATIONALITY 22 
(1983). 
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consumes [quantity X], the second individual must consume an equal 
but negative quantity . . . .”50 In effect, these are zero sum goods. Rawls’ 
view is somewhat similar: 
A person who is better off may wish those less fortunate than he to 
stay in their place. He is jealous of his superior position and 
begrudges them the greater advantages that would put them on a 
level with himself. And should this propensity extend to denying 
them benefits that he does not need and cannot use himself, then 
he is moved by spite.51 
While Rawls wrote in terms of denying benefits to others, the fact is 
that spite is likely to be mixed with other motives. Being motivated to 
consume, at least in part, because others cannot is enough to evidence 
spite. 
In his 1992 article, Relative Preferences,52 Richard McAdams pulls many 
of these themes together.53 He refers to relative and absolute other-
regarding preferences. In the case of relative other-regarding 
preferences, “one derives pleasure or displeasure from the fact of 
another’s consumption level in relation to one’s own, i.e., where the ratio 
of one’s consumption to the other’s determines the effect on one’s 
satisfaction.”54 A negative relative preference is one in which there “is a 
preference for a consumption position that is favorable in comparison to 
that of others.”55 Thus, “making someone absolutely better off may itself 
make others worse off if the others prefer to maintain a certain economic 
position relative to the one whose wealth is increased.”56 In effect, a 
person can increase his or her satisfaction by lowering the relative 
consumptive position of those of lower rank, raising the consumptive 
position of oneself, or both. The goal of these purchases is to increases 
the distance between those who are higher ranked from those of lower 
rank. According to McAdams, “‘[c]onsumptive position’ may refer to the 
quantity or the quality of particular goods, including intangible goods 
such as prestige, or it may refer to the sum of all goods, i.e., wealth.”57  
There is no question that position goods present greater complexity 
than the more traditional spiteful actions. In a sense they involve a softer 
 
50 Ugo Pagano, Is Power an Economic Good? Notes on Social Scarcity and the Economics 
of Positional Goods, in THE POLITICS AND ECONOMICS OF POWER 63, 63 (Samuel Bowles, 
et al. eds., 1999); Mason, supra note 45, at 124.  
51 RAWLS, supra note 15, at 533.  
52 Richard H. McAdams, Relative Preferences, 102 YALE L.J. 1, 7 (1992). 
53 For the history of this perspective, see also Nestor M. Davidson, Property and 
Relative Status, 107 MICH. L. REV. 757, 777–78 (2009).  
54 McAdams, supra note 52, at 8. In the case of absolute other regarding 
preferences, the pleasure or displeasure is unrelated to one’s own.  
55 Id. at 9. 
56 Id. at 4–5 (emphasis removed). 
57 Id. at 9. 
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version of spite. This is because there is unlikely to be any personal 
animus,58 and one does not have a sense of directly denying benefits to 
others. Nevertheless, the act of consuming these relatively scarce items 
makes it less likely that others can share in the benefits, and part of the 
reason for their pricing and desirability is the denial of others. Put more 
bluntly, like spite more generally, positional goods represent an 
investment that is only rationale if others are made relatively worse off.  
Imagine this thought experiment. You test drive a car and enjoy its 
comfort, style, acceleration, and handling qualities. You like it enough to 
buy it. The salesperson then presents you with a choice. For $40,000 you 
may buy the car and it will display the Kia identification. Or, for $55,000 
you can buy the same car and it will carry the Bentley insignia. Very 
importantly, no one will ever suspect the cars are actually the same 
except for the labeling. In effect, are you willing to pay $15,000 simply for 
the impression the car makes on others and for the exclusiveness it 
signals? Perhaps not, but would you pay $1.00? In either case, you are 
actually buying the appearance of scarcity and exclusivity, and ultimately, 
the only value you derive is the knowledge that others have the 
appearance of being worse off. Regardless of what your choice might be 
or how much you would pay in this situation, we know that there is an 
enormous market ranging from watches and handbags,59 to yachts, 
houses, and cars for signaling goods.60  
This may not seem as spiteful as tapping on your brakes when the 
tailgating driver gets too close or as turning down an offer in the 
ultimatum game even though it makes you and your partner worse off. 
Nevertheless, the motivation is the same. To elevate oneself relative to 
others means lowering their rank, perhaps even their sense of well-being, 
and encouraging the negative utility associated with envy. In short, you 
feel better because others may perceive themselves to be lower-ranked, 
and hopefully, experience a sense of frustration.  
D. Spite as Theft 
Self-regarding spite has characteristics that are similar to theft.61 We 
do not condone theft for moral as well as economic reasons. First, on 
purely ethical grounds one may take a Kantian perspective that one 
should not use others as means to their ends.62 This is not to say that Kant 
 
58 Although the case of jealous neighbors may be an exception.  
59 See infra text accompanying notes 172–74. 
60 See ROBERT H. FRANK, LUXURY FEVER 139–40 (1999); Frank, supra note 45, at 
139–40. 
61 Of course, in the case of theft, the perpetrator believes there will be a material 
gain. The spiteful person is not out for material gain.  
62 See H.B. ACTON, KANT’S MORAL PHILOSOPHY 35–41 (1970) (discussing Kant’s 
principle of autonomy); IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES OF VIRTUE 114 
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would rule out spite-like actions based on the view that a wrong must be 
addressed. That is different, however, from the self-regarding concept of 
spite. 
Second, it is hard to square theft with any concept of efficiency. For 
example, it cannot be efficient under a Pareto standard, because the 
victim of the theft is worse off.63 In addition, it may or may not be 
efficient from the standpoint of maximizing utility. Stealing a painting 
may increase my welfare, but for it to be efficient theft, I would have to 
make sure your utility is decreased by less than mine is increased. This 
could be the case. Perhaps I love the painting and you were growing 
quite tired of it. The problem is that it requires the thief to make an 
interpersonal comparison of utility, which is impossible. Theft might be 
efficient from a Kaldor-Hicks perspective. Under Kaldor-Hicks, or wealth 
maximization, the transfer would be efficient if I valued the painting 
more than you did even if you were not compensated for the loss.64 Here 
though, without an actually consensual exchange it is impossible to know 
who attributes the greater value to the painting. 
Now take spite. The same concerns arise. Aside from whatever moral 
qualms one may have about making some people worse off simply 
because that increases the utility of the spiteful person, the risks of 
inefficiency are no less than in the case of theft. Again, from the Paretian 
standpoint, at least one party is worse off. A utilitarian analysis is more 
complicated and even riskier than in the context of theft. In general, 
spite involves making oneself worse off in order to make the victim worse 
off. There is no net payoff unless the victim is perceived to be more worse 
off than the spiteful person. This could be the case but opens up a 
number of possibilities for error all stemming from the difficulty of a 
comparison. To illustrate, go back to the example of the brake tapper. 
Two types of errors may occur. The first is the inefficiency error. For 
example, you may touch your brakes lightly to annoy a tailgating driver 
 
(James Ellington trans., The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc. 1964) (1797) (respect for others’ 
autonomy is a duty of virtue); ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 32 (1974) 
(using an individual for the greater social good fails to show sufficient respect for the 
individual); Jeffrey L. Harrison, Egoism, Altruism, and Market Illusions: The Limits of Law 
and Economics, 33 UCLA L. REV. 1309, 1334 (1986). 
63 A Pareto superior outcome is achieved when a transfer leaves at least one party 
better off and no one worse off. See THOMAS COTTER & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, LAW AND 
ECONOMICS 45–46 (3d ed. 2013). In the case of spite, quite possibly both are worse off 
at least materially. In the case of positional goods, the cost of spite is the premium 
paid for the signaling quality of the good. 
64  Id. at 51–52. In many respects, the concept of efficient spite is like efficient 
breach in the context of contracts. It is possible for the breaching party to be more 
better off than the non- breaching party is worse off. The problem is that it is 
impossible to tell. Even if there is full compensation, there is no guarantee that the 
non-breaching party is in as good a position, subjectively, as he or she would have 
been in the absence of a breach. Id. at 304–305.  
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only to see him or her speed off around you without a care in the world. 
The second error is a misperception error.65 You touch your brakes but 
do not realize the tailgater was in no hurry and actually did not even 
notice. In the spirit of “I’ll show him a thing or two,” you showed him 
nothing. When it comes to Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, the same dangers 
arise. Just as it is impossible to know the impact on utility, it is impossible 
to know what it would take to compensate the victim.66 
This suggests that spiteful actions require the same type of legal 
responses that are employed to deter theft. There are important 
differences that in the minds of many may make spite even more 
troublesome. The thief is generally indifferent to who is harmed. There 
may be no personal animus involved at all. Spite, though, is generally 
personal. People are targeted because of who they are. Second, at least in 
some instances, spite-like behavior can result from purely moral 
considerations. This is less likely to be the case in instances of theft but 
raises the issue of whether spite-like behavior should, in some instances, 
be tolerated.   
III.  THE LAW OF SPITEFULNESS 
A. Tort Law 
1. Generally  
As noted earlier,67 negligence is unlikely to be associated with spiteful 
actions. The negligent party is guilty of indifference or a calculated effort 
to save money. The notion of investing to harm others simply because the 
harm produces a positive response in the actor seems strained in those 
instances. On the other hand, intentional harms may very well be 
spiteful. It can range from the well-known “spite fences,” to practical 
jokes that are “beneficial” to one party because of the humiliation of 
another, as well as assaults and defamation. If spite is akin to theft, and 
the position taken here is that it is, the response should logically be the 
same as it is in cases of theft. In tort law this would mean awarding 
punitive damages.68  
 
65 There is an additional possible complication here. The victim of spite suffers, 
and the spiteful person’s pleasure must exceed that suffering. Suppose, however, that 
the victim’s harm is itself dependent on the amount of pleasure derived by the 
spiteful actor. If true, even the hypothetical possibility of efficient spite seems to fade.  
66 See POSNER, supra note 4, at 205.  
67 See supra text accompanying note 14. 
68 Richard Posner makes a case for punitive damages in these cases as a way of 
motivating victims to bring private actions, and thus, to relieve the pressure on 
criminal law. POSNER, supra note 4, at 207. See generally A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven 
Shavell, Punitive Damages: An Economic Analysis, 111 HARV. L. REV. 869, 909–10 (1998). 
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There is, however, an important distinction between theft and spite 
that may have implications for this response. In the case of theft, aside 
from important moral considerations described above, the idea is to 
channel the transfer of wealth into the market. Thus, if I want your car 
and am inclined to simply take it, the threat of punitive damages means it 
would be less expensive for me to seek your permission by reaching an 
agreement on the compensation due. In the case of spite, there is 
unlikely to be compensation. In the case of spite, an actual transaction 
seems unlikely. After all, the pleasure of the spiteful person is derived 
from the displeasure of victim. The idea of channeling the transaction 
into the market makes little sense. If the victim consents, it eliminates the 
pleasure for the person acting out of spite.  
Take the example of a spite fence. Landowner A is angry at his 
neighbor, B, because B’s son operates a loud but legal motorcycle. A has 
approached B and even offered to pay to have the noise reduced. He was 
told to mind his own business and to “get a life!” A constructs an eight-
foot fence between their properties that blocks B’s view of some distant 
mountains. In the case of theft, by virtue of punitive damages or criminal 
penalties, we would prefer to channel the transaction into the market, 
and B would sell his right to his view for a price. B would demand a price 
that means he is at least indifferent between the view and the sum paid. 
Of course, that would not happen because A’s entire purpose is to make 
B worse off. Alternatively, B may file a lawsuit. If he prevails, the court, in 
effect, sets the price. The price might be higher, lower, or equal to that 
demanded by B in a voluntary transaction. In no case do we know if 
efficiency in any form is served, and clearly, the spiteful person uses 
others without their consent to achieve his or her ends. In fact, lack of 
consent is the source of the pleasure.    
Given that efficient spite is but a possibility and that there can be 
enormous costs to the spiteful person, it is arguably most efficient to 
discourage spite or decrease its consequences. This can be done in two 
ways. First, if possible, the gains to the spiteful actor could be disgorged. 
This is impossible to measure in monetary terms. Plus, it cannot be a 
successful determent unless it is effective 100% of time.69 Nevertheless, in 
the cases of removal of spite fences70 and the retraction of defamatory 
statements, for example, this can be comparable to undoing the harm. 
Otherwise, penalties are appropriate. 
And, as it turns out, whether on moral, efficiency, or some other 
basis, tort law does signal general societal disapproval of spiteful actions.71 
 
69 Unless the probability of success by victims is 100%, there may still be positive 
expected gains from spiteful actions.  
70 See, e.g., Geiger v. Carey, 154 A.3d 1093, 1101 (Conn. App. 2017); Austin v. 
Bald II, L.L.C., 658 S.E.2d 1, 3 (N.C. App. 2008). 
71 See, e.g., Soderbeck V. Burnett Cty, Wis. 752 F.2d 285, 290 (7th Cir. 1985); 
Lewis v. Bellows Falls Congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, 248 F. Supp. 3d 530, 543 
Harrison_Ready_For_printer_9-4 (Do Not Delete) 9/11/2018  9:53 AM 
1006 LEWIS & CLARK LAW REVIEW [Vol. 22:3 
Whether it follows through on this “signal” or is sensitive to equity 
seeking or even the occasional benefits of non-self-regarding spiteful 
behavior is another matter. To illustrate this distinction, consider three 
cases. In a North Carolina case, Austin v. Bald II,72 plaintiff owned a home 
next to an apartment development. The apartment property was 
surrounded by a six-foot-high fence except for the portion that ran along 
plaintiff’s property. That part of the fence was ten feet tall and blocked 
the view of a nearby lake and the breezes that came off the lake. There 
was testimony that when asked why the fence was ten feet tall, an 
employee of the defendant remarked, “we are going to show her.”73 The 
court reversed the trial court decision not to permit the jury to consider 
punitive damages. 
Other cases suggest a different approach to the spiteful actor who is 
equity seeking.74 But this is not always the case. In Humphrey v. Manbach,75 
the appellants appealed from a decision that they had erected a spite 
fence. Although the appellate court reversed on other grounds, it noted 
that before the fence was erected “appellees’ children had been 
trespassing upon appellants’ lot and destroying flowers and shrubbery 
thereon; that after they protested to appellees, the latter refused to take 
steps to prevent further trespasses . . . ; that appellees’ children would 
come upon appellants’ property immodestly attired and commit acts of 
indecency directed toward appellants . . . .”76 
Although not exactly on point and politically objectionable in many 
respects, another case also illustrates some leeway for the spiteful person 
who perceives him or herself as protesting an injustice. Johnson v. 
Johnson77 dealt with punitive damages in the context of a spouse calling 
 
(D. Vt. 2017); Estate of Jackson v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 676 F. Supp. 1142, 1149 
(S.D. Ala. 1987); Lee v. Crump, 40 So. 609, 610 (Ala. 1906); Fousel v. Ted Walker 
Mobile Homes, Inc., 602 P.2d 507, 511 (Ariz. 1979); Geiger, 154 A.3d at 1113–14; 
Austin, 658 S.E.2d at 3; Clements v. Withers, 437 S.W.2d 818, 822 (Tex. 1969); 
Watkins v. Simonds, 354 P.2d 852, 854 (Utah 1960). See generally DAN B. DOBBS, 1 
DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES 455 (2d ed. 1993); W. PAGE KEETON, PROSSER & KEETON ON 
THE LAW OF TORTS 9–10 (5th ed. 1984). This is not to say that spite is necessary for the 
award of punitive damages. See Crues v. KFC Corp., 729 F.2d 1145, 1153 (8th Cir. 
1984); Tierco Md. Inc. v. Williams, 849 A.2d 504, 526 (Md. Ct. App. 2004); Burnett v. 
Thrifty Imports, 773 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Miss. Ct. App. 1989); Prime Co. v. Wilkinson & 
Snowden, Inc., No. W2003-00696-COA-R3CV, 2004 WL 2218574 at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. 
Sept. 30, 2004).  
72 Austin, 658 S.E.2d at 3. 
73 Id. It appears that the plaintiff was on a city commission that played a role in 
denying the expansion of the complex although the plaintiff had no part in that 
decision. Id. at 5.  
74 See supra note 71 and accompanying text. 
75 Humphrey v. Mansbach, 64 S.W.2d 454, 455 (Ky. 1933). 
76 Id.  
77 Johnson v. Johnson, 654 A.2d 1212, 1212 (R.I. 1995). 
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his ex-wife a “whore” in a public place. Evidently, after their marriage the 
wife had numerous sexual affairs with men including the husband’s 
cousin who she also later married and divorced.78 There were in fact, a 
string of divorces, affairs, and pregnancies.79 Eventually, the former wife 
returned to the original husband (the defendant) and claimed they had 
a common law marriage from which she wanted a divorce and a property 
settlement.80 Although the court claimed otherwise, the case is likely 
indicative of gender bias.81 The rationale for not permitting punitive 
damages reflects a willingness to tolerate some level of informal equity 
seeking: “We are then confronted with the question concerning whether 
a truthful statement, but one issued with a supportable finding of spite or 
ill will under enormous provocation may meet the rigorous standard we 
set for punitive damages. We believe that it does not.”82 
2. The Cases: Empirical and Qualitative Assessment 
Aside from the examples above, there is little additional evidence 
that courts acknowledge that spiteful actors may be justice seekers. What 
is clear from a broader perspective is that tort law takes a dim view of 
those who act out of spite. This can be inferred from a quantitative or 
empirical perspective and a qualitative one. A general examination of 
tort law in this regard found the words “spite” and “punitive damages” in 
the same paragraph without the term “in spite of” in nearly 1,100 
opinions.83 In addition, the terms “actual malice”—a common substitute 
for “spite”—and “punitive damages” were in the same paragraph without 
the term “in spite of” in 4,700 opinions.84 Finally, 306 opinions used the 
terms “actual malice,” “spite,” and “punitive damages” in the same 
paragraph, again excluding cases that used the term “in spite of.”85 As a 
general matter, when the terms “spite” and “actual malice” were found in 
the same paragraph, a court was defining actual malice. For example, as 
one Texas case put it: “Texas permits recovery of punitive damages for 
 
78 Id. at 1213–14. 
79 Id. at 1214. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 1217. 
82 Id. 
83 Westlaw Search for Cases Including “Spite” and “Punitive Damages,” WESTLAW, 
https://goo.gl/AoMvWK (search using the following: spite! /p “punitive damages” % 
“in spite of”). “In spite of” was eliminated because the phrase is commonly used in 
cases that would be irrelevant for the research at hand.  
84 Westlaw Search for Cases Including “Actual Malice” and “Punitive Damages,” 
WESTLAW, https://goo.gl/FjKGoN (search using the following: “actual malice” /p 
“punitive damages” % “in spite of”). 
85 Westlaw Search for Cases Including “Actual Malice,” “Spite,” and “Punitive 
Damages”, WESTLAW, https://goo.gl/626B2S (search using the following: “actual 
malice” /p spite! /p “punitive damages” % “in spite of”). 
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wrongful discharge upon a showing of actual malice, defined as ‘ill will, 
spite, evil motive, or specific intent to cause injury to the employee.’”86 
Clearly, “spite” or its substitute “actual malice” plays a key role in the 
award of punitive damages. Because the search involving “punitive 
damages” and “spite” or its substitute, “actual malice” yielded an unwieldy 
number of possible “observations,” three narrower and specific areas 
were more closely examined. These were cases of abuse of process and 
malicious prosecution.87 In addition, although not a tort, it was felt that 
cases involving possible Rule 11 sanctions, which have a tort-like 
character, would also be informative.88 These areas were selected because 
they seem particularly likely to involve actions in which a party would act 
simply to make an opponent worse off. 
 According to Prosser, abuse of process is designed to provide a 
remedy “for a group of cases in which legal procedure has been set in 
motion in proper form, with probable cause, and even with ultimate 
success, but nevertheless has been perverted to accomplish an ulterior 
purpose for which it was not designed.”89 The key is that the process is 
used to produce a result for which the process was not designed. A 
Westlaw search found 388 cases in which the terms “spite” and “abuse of 
process” were found in the same paragraph. In 717 instances, the terms 
“abuse of process” and “actual malice” were found in the same 
paragraph. Courts are very clear that the defendant in these cases may be 
motivated by spite or ill will but as long as the goal sought is the one the 
process was designed for, there will be no liability.90 Consequently, “abuse 
of process” cases did not reveal a policy to punish spite. And, although 
 
86 Richey v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. 670 F. Supp. 2d 608, 611 (S.D. Texas, 2009); see, 
e.g., Drug Fair of Md., Inc. v. Smith, 283 A.2d 392, 398 (Md. Ct. App. 1971); Burnett v. 
Thrifty Imports, 773 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Miss. Ct. App. 1989); Bennett v. 3M Co., No. 
3:14-CV-198, 2014 WL 1493188 at *2 (E.D. Va. Apr. 15, 2014).  
87 Tortious interference of contract was also examined. See infra text 
accompanying notes 132–35. 
88 See infra text accompanying notes 101–08. 
89 KEETON, supra note 71, at 897.  
90 See, e.g., Scott v. D.C., 101 F.3d 748, 755 (D.C. Cir. 1996); Jensen v. Barlas, 438 
F. Supp. 2d 988, 1003 (N.D. Iowa 2006); Grabinski v. Natl’ Union Fire Ins. Co., No. 
CV041751PHXMHM, 2005 WL 2412784 at *5 (D. Ariz. Sept. 23, 2005); Shoney’s, Inc. 
v. Barnett, 773 So. 2d 1015, 1025–26 (Ala. Civ. App. 1999); Bothmann v. Harrington, 
458 So. 2d 1163, 1169 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.  1984); Bourbon Cty. Joint Planning Com’n 
v. Simpson, 799 S.W.2d 42, 45 (Ky. Ct. App. 1990). But see Pundzak, Inc. v. Cook, 500 
N.W.2d 424, 429–30 (Iowa 1993). Although spiteful intent is not required to establish 
abuse of process, spite can enter into the decision about punitive damages for the 
defendant who is found guilty of an abuse of process. See Nitcher v. Does, 956 F.2d 
796, 800–01 (8th Cir. 1992). As noted above, though, a great number of these cases 
noted that even spiteful actors may not be guilty of abuse of process. See generally 3 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 683, cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977). 
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courts are tolerant of spite, it was hardly because the spiteful people, like 
the ultimatum game participants, were justice seekers.  
More instructive was a survey of cases involving malicious 
prosecution. In 1,872 cases, the terms “actual malice” and “malicious 
prosecution” were found in the same paragraph. In 451 cases, the terms 
“spite” and “malicious prosecution” were found in the same paragraph. 
In 142 cases, all three terms were found in the same paragraph. The 
elements of malicious prosecution are: the institution of a proceeding, 
termination of that proceeding in favor of the accused, absence of 
probable cause, and malicious motivation.91 These cases provide a closer 
look at the role of spite since the accused must be cleared of any 
wrongdoing, which raises the likelihood that the prosecutor92 was simply 
interested in the harmful effects on the defendant. It should be noted 
that spite or actual malice is not always required for malicious 
prosecution. They appear to be sufficient but not necessary for a finding of 
liability. Instead, legal malice, as opposed to actual malice, often will be 
inferred from an absence of probable cause.93  
What this means is that the range of cases goes from ones in which 
there was obvious ill will toward specific individuals to those in which 
there seems to be no more than indifference to the welfare of others. 94 A 
typical example of a case in which spite appeared critical was Grundstein 
v. Levin,95 which involved a group of siblings that had inherited a parcel 
of land. The land was partitioned but one of the siblings refused to leave 
when the others had found buyers for their shares. Eventually that sibling 
left but sued the others for conversion of the personal property he left 
behind.96 The others countersued for abuse of process and malicious 
prosecution.97 The court found no abuse of process but found that there 
was malicious prosecution. The Vermont Supreme Court affirmed and 
wrote: 
The [lower] court found that plaintiff’s multiple post-partition 
motions and appeals were baseless; that there was no objectively 
reasonable basis to believe that they were meritorious; that they 
were brought by plaintiff “in bad faith and with ill will and actual 
malice” and “solely out of spite and for the purpose of thwarting his 
siblings and preventing them from exercising their rights duly 
 
91 KEETON, supra note 71, at 871. 
92 Prosecutor is used here generally to mean the person giving rise to the action, 
whether criminal or civil.  
93  See Lowth v. Town of Cheektowaga, 82 F.3d 563, 571–72 (2d Cir. 1996); Lee v. 
Mihalich, 847 F.2d 66, 69–70 (3d Cir. 1988); Pallares v. Seinar, 756 S.E.2d 128, 131 
(S.C. 2014).  
94 This search excluded incidents of the use of the term “in spite of.” 
95 Grundstein v. Levin, No. 16-242, 2017 WL 571272, at *1 (Vt. Feb. 1, 2017). 
96 Id. 
97 Id.  
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granted them by the partition judgment”; and that defendants 
prevailed in all of them.98 
In the context of malicious prosecution, courts seem to be in line 
with the idea that spite can be analogized to theft in that a finding of 
actual malice is followed by awarding punitive damages.99 
Although not a tort, Rule 11 sanctions have a tort-like quality. In fact, 
over 20 years ago, it was noted that Rule 11100 plays a role similar to the 
rules against spite fences.101 The question here is to what extent courts 
take spiteful motives into account when sanctioning an attorney for Rule 
11 violations. Again, it is difficult to separate cases involving spite as 
defined here from efforts meant to harass with some hope for more than 
psychic gain. Nevertheless, spite is often mentioned as the basis for Rule 
11 sanctions.102 A good example is Fox v. Boucher,103 a Second Circuit 
 
98 Id. at *2. 
99 See Goodwin v. Metts, 885 F.2d 157, 166 (4th Cir. 1989); Hampton v. Mathis, 
No. 87-2653, No. 87-2654, 1988 U.S. App. LEXIS 20542, at *11–12 (4th Cir. Sept. 1, 
1988); Chavez v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 525 F.2d 827, 831 (10th Cir. 1975); Scott v. 
Bender, 948 F. Supp. 2d 859, 871 (N.D. Ill. 2013); Tierco Md. Inc. v. Williams, 849 
A.2d 504, 526 (Md. Ct. App. 2004); Sanders v. Daniel Int’l Corp., 682 S.W.2d 803, 814 
(Mo. 1984); Abbitt v. Bartlett, 112 S.E.2d 751, 753–54 (N.C. 1960); Columbus 
Finance, Inc. v. Howard, 327 N.E.2d 654, 658 (Ohio 1975); Davis v. Tunison, 155 
N.E.2d 904, 906–07 (Ohio 1959); Lee v. Southland Corp., 244 S.E.2d 756, 759 (Va. 
1978); Gaut v. Pyles, 181 S.E.2d 645, 647 (Va. 1971). For the necessity of actual malice 
in the context of tortious interference, see Texas Beef Cattle Co. v. Green, 921 S.W.2d 
203, 210 (Tex. 1996). 
100 FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b) (“(b) Representations to the Court. By presenting to the 
court a pleading, written motion, or other paper—whether by signing, filing, 
submitting, or later advocating it—an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to 
the best of the person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry 
reasonable under the circumstances: (1) it is not being presented for any improper 
purpose, such as to harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of 
litigation; (2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by 
existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing 
existing law or for establishing new law; (3) the factual contentions have evidentiary 
support or, if specifically so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a 
reasonable opportunity for further investigation or discovery; and (4) the denials of 
factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or, if specifically so identified, are 
reasonably based on belief or a lack of information.”). 
101 Joseph M. Perillo, Abuse of Rights: A Pervasive Legal Concept, 27 PAC. L.J. 37, 67 
(1995). See also Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1685 
(2011). 
102 See, e.g., Fox v. Boucher, 794 F.2d 34, 37–38 (2nd Cir. 1986); Cavallary v. 
Lakewood Sky Diving Ctr., 623 F. Supp. 242, 246 (S.D.N.Y. 1985); Florida Bar v. 
Pascoe, 526 So. 2d 912, 913 (Fla. 1988); Tilman v. Brink, 911 N.E.2d 764, 770 (Mass. 
App. Ct. 2009); Taupa Lithuanian Fed. Credit Union v. Bajercius, 1997 Mass. App. 
Div. LEXIS 15, at *9 (Mass. App. Div. Mar. 11, 1997). See also Mortell v. Mortell Co., 
887 F.2d 1322, 1328 (7th Cir. 1989). 
103 Fox, 794 F.2d at 37–38. 
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opinion in which the plaintiff, an attorney, leased a home to the Hogges. 
When Mr. Hogge died suddenly, Mrs. Hogge moved out and, by 
telephone, requested a return of her security deposit. Fox refused noting 
that she probably did not need the money since she likely collected 
insurance. Hogge became upset and handed the phone to her father 
(Boucher) and an argument ensued in which Boucher may have referred 
to Fox as a “rich lawyer.”104 Eventually, Hogge sued and recovered the 
security deposit, and in the aftermath, was told by Fox that “I’m going to 
get you for this.”105 Fox then sued Boucher on a theory of prima facie tort 
and requested punitive damages. The lower court sanctioned Fox and 
was upheld by the Second Circuit, which reasoned that, “[c]ourts look 
with disfavor on this sort of unfounded spite action.”106 
This examination finds that spite plays a key role in awarding 
punitive damages, in finding malicious prosecution, and in Rule 11 
sanctions. Although the same tendency was not found in the case of 
abuse of process, it can safely be said that tort law is designed to 
discourage spiteful actions. On the other hand, there was no evidence 
that tort law created a safe harbor for justice seekers or those acting for 
non-self-regarding reasons.107  
B. Arising Out of Contractual Relations 
The search for judicial reactions to spite was extended to contract 
law. One initial possibility concerned duress and Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts, section 176(2)(a)108 which includes this definition of an 
improper threat: “the threatened act would harm the recipient and 
would not significantly benefit the party making the threat, . . . .”109 
Examples include a threat to reveal harmful information about a party 
unless he or she will enter into a contract.110 Although there is a clear 
spite-like flavor to these types of threats, there is ultimately a payoff for 
the threatening party that extends beyond the satisfaction of simply 
harming another. 
As in conventional tort remedies, the more fertile areas for reacting 
to spite would be in the area of damages. In the context of a contract 
breach, punitive damages are generally not permitted even if the breach 
 
104 Id. at 38. This was denied by Boucher.  
105 Id. at 36. 
106 Id. at 38.  
107 One qualifying comment is in order. The definition of spite in the context of 
tort law is broader than the one employed in this Article. This follows from the 
notion that spite is often equated with actual malice, which, itself can, but not always, 
be inferred from the harshness of one’s action. 
108 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 176 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
109 Id. 
110 Id. at Illustration 12.  
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were designed simply to injure another and create predominately psychic 
gains for the breaching party. Probably the best-known example of this 
resistance is White v. Benkowski.111 The Whites purchased a house without 
an independent water supply but contracted for the supply of water from 
their neighbors, the Benkowskis. Evidently the parties had a friendly 
relationship that turned sour at which time the Benkowskis began to shut 
the supply of water off intermittently.112 The jury found that the 
Benkowskis had acted maliciously and simply to harass113 but disallowed 
an award of punitive damages.114     
In general, even if there were spiteful breaches like that in White v. 
Benkowski, under the expectancy measure of damages, the non-breaching 
party is compensated for whatever monetary harm is suffered. This, of 
course, is the notion of an efficient breach, a theory that has been 
roundly criticized.115 Nevertheless, whether the efficient breach is a 
mirage or not, contract theory seems to go out of its way to avoid 
penalizing those who breach. Indeed, under conventional law with 
respect to liquidated damages, the parties may not even stipulate to 
damages that would constitute a penalty.116  
In the case of the efficient breach, the breaching party is seen to 
gain, in a monetary sense by virtue of the breach. This has generated 
some calls for disgorgement of these gains.117 This is related to a 
theoretical reaction to spite. The spiteful contract breaching party is 
rewarded in part by the psychic gain from making his or her contractual 
counterpart worse off. Although impossible to measure, the need to 
cancel these psychic gains amounts to an argument for routine punitive 
damages when breaches are spiteful. Nevertheless, there appear to be no 
reported cases in which a plaintiff has recovered on the basis of the 
psychic pleasure experienced by the breaching party as a result of 
harming another.  
 
111 White v. Benkowski, 155 N.W.2d 74, 77 (Wis. 1967). 
112 Unlike the typical efficient breach scenario, there was no sign that the water 
was to be sold to a higher bidder. 
113 White, 155 N.W.2d at 78. 
114 Id. at 77–78. 
115 See generally Jeffrey L. Harrison, A Nihilistic View of the Efficient Breach, 2013 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 167, 176 (2013); Peter Linzer, On the Amorality of Contract Remedies—
Efficiency, Equity, and the Second Restatement, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 111, 116–17 (1981). 
116 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 356 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
117 Kelsey A. Hayward, Comment, Disgorgement of Defendant’s Gains from 
“Opportunistic” Breach of Contract: Its Fit in Rhode Island, 22 Roger Williams U. L. Rev. 
614, 616 (2017); John D. McCamus, Disgorgement for Breach of Contract: A Comparative 
Perspective, 36 LOYOLA OF L.A. L. REV. 943, 943 (2003); Caprice L. Roberts, A 
Commonwealth of Perspective on Restitutionary Disgorgement for Breach of Contract, 65 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 945, 948 (2008). 
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Four thin possibilities exist for courts to react to spite in the context 
of contracts. First, not every court has followed the teachings of White v. 
Benkowski; there appear to be isolated instances in which courts do allow 
the recovery of punitive damages for breach of contract unrelated to a 
tort claim. A word of caution is warranted here: The fact that punitive 
damages may be permitted does not mean they are rewarded consistently 
or at all for spiteful breaches. Second, there are instances in which what 
would be a contract breach is successfully pled as a tort claim. Here 
again, the connection to spiteful or malicious action is tenuous. Third, 
and more promising, are cases based on tortious interference. Finally, 
there are isolated cases that allow for recovery of mental suffering as a 
result of contract breach. These damages seem susceptible to having a 
punitive element, and thus, may reflect a policy opposed to spite. 
The examination of the first possibility begins with a 1999 article by 
William Dodge representing a painstaking study of the availability of 
punitive damages in breach of contract cases.118 As of 1998, Dodge found 
that eight states allowed or appeared to allow punitive damages.119 He 
concluded, however, that the trend was toward lessening the availability 
of punitive damages in contracts cases.120 The difficulty of pinning down 
the actual position of each state is exemplified by Tennessee in which 
courts have stated that there are exceptions to the no punitive damages 
rule in cases of “fraud, malice, gross negligence or oppression.”121 On the 
other hand, Tennessee courts have also written, “[t]he rare case where 
punitive damages may be awarded for breach of contract under 
Tennessee law occur when the breach of contract ‘is coupled with a tort 
involving, fraud, malice, gross negligence, or oppression.’”122 Similarly, 
Hawaii, which seems to allow punitive damages for breach of contract 
 
118 William S. Dodge, The Case for Punitive Damages in Contracts, 48 DUKE L.J. 629, 
633–34 (1999). See also Mark Pennington, Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract: A Core 
Sample from the Decisions of the Last Ten Years, 42 ARK. L. REV. 31, 31 (1989). 
119 Dodge, supra note 118, at 647–48 (Four more states allowed punitive damages 
if there existed a special relationship between the parties. The 8 states seeming to 
allow punitive damages were Hawaii, Idaho, Mississippi, New Mexico, Rhode Island, 
South Carolina, Tennessee, and Vermont.). 
120 Id. at 635. 
121 Medley v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 912 S.W.2d 748, 753 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1995). 
See also, Bennett v. CMH Homes, Inc., Nos. 15-5541/5577, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 
16930, at *18 (6th Cir. Sept. 13, 2016); Mohr v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. W2006-
01382-COA-R3-CV, 2008 Tenn. App. LEXIS 619, at *40–41 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 
2008). 
122 Boyd v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., Case 2:11-cv-02616-STA-cgc, 2012 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 183690, at *26–27 (W.D. Tenn. Nov. 8, 2012) (quoting Smith v. 
Nationwide Property & Cas. Ins. Co., 505 F.3d 401, 408 (6th Cir. 2007) (emphasis 
added)). 
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puts it this way: “[B]reach of contract in Hawaii must result in ‘tortious 
injury’ to justify an award of punitive damages.”123 
When courts do award punitive damages in contracts cases, the facts 
typically resemble those that would support a claim in tort. For example, 
in VanDyke v. Mountain Coin Machine Distributors,124 a Utah case, the 
breach of contract—a settlement—claim was closely related to abuse of 
process. Evidently, the breach was in the form of a lawsuit filed after a 
dispute about a debt had been settled. The lower court instructed the 
jury that punitive damages under contract were available if the breach 
was “intentional and accompanied by malice.”125 On the other hand, in a 
decision by the Utah Supreme Court, the court noted that “we and other 
jurisdictions have allowed punitive damages where the breach of contract 
amounts to an independent tort.”126  
Given the paucity of cases in which punitive damages are awarded in 
contracts it made sense to explore contract breaches that were pled as 
tort claims. More specifically, to what extent is spite a factor in those 
cases that cross over the so-called borderline127 between contract and 
tort? It would be a simple matter if the crucial variable were spite. It is not 
that simple. Although difficult to support with actual case analysis, the 
standard that makes the most sense in this context is that contract crosses 
over to tort, and therefore, the possibility of punitive damages when the 
“harm is deliberately caused and the satisfaction obtained by the actor is 
‘illicit.’”128 Illicit is, however, broader than the psychic rewards of simply 
making another party worse off. For example, an insured may be 
awarded punitive damages when an insurer persistently refuses to pay a 
claim that is due. In fact, at least one court found that this behavior was 
evidence that the insurer “acted maliciously, with an intent to oppress, 
and in conscious disregard of the rights of its insured.”129 In these types of 
cases, often dealing with the absence of fair dealing or good faith, the 
target selected is based on the monetary benefit to be gained by the 
breaching party. The element of personal animus necessary to be labeled 
“spiteful” is not present. 
 
123 Cuson v. Maryland Cas. Co., 735 F. Supp. 966, 970 (D. Haw. 1990). See also 
TruGreen Cos. v. Mower Bros., Inc., 199 P.3d 929, 933 (Utah 2008). 
124 VanDyke v. Mountain Coin Machine Distribs., Inc., 758 P.2d 962, 963 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1988). 
125 Id. at 964. 
126 Jorgensen v. John Clay & Company, 660 P.2d 229, 232 (Utah 1983). 
127 See Leslie E. John, Formulating Standards for Awards of Punitive Damages in the 
Borderland of Contract and Tort, 74 CAL. L. REV. 2033, 2034 (1986). 
128 Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. 
CAL. L. REV. 1, 77 (1982). 
129 Neal v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 582 P.2d 980, 986–87 (Cal. 1978). See generally 
John, supra note 127. 
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Frank Cavico captures the tort/contract distinction when he suggests 
that tortious breach should include cases in which the defendant’s 
conduct “maliciously or oppressively caused harm to the plaintiff.”130 It 
requires something more than an “economic decision not to perform.”131 
Moreover, punitive damages would apply when there is an intentional 
breach “with the intent of causing the victim harm beyond the harm usually 
considered as reasonably foreseeable for breach of contract.”132 Cavico 
distinguishes the type of behavior leading to punitive damages from bad 
faith in which the primary goal is not to harm the victim.133 Nevertheless, 
many tortious breach cases fall under the general label of “bad faith” and 
the effort here was to probe these cases to see the extent to which they 
seemed to address spite in its purest form.  
To assess whether spite was a factor in awarding punitive damages in 
tortious breach cases, a sample of 271 cases using the search terms set out 
in the footnote was selected.134 Well over half of the sample involved cases 
in which insurers refused to pay or defend insureds and were, therefore, 
alleged to have acted in bad faith.135 Regardless of how one feels about 
the practice of insurance companies of delaying or refusing to pay, these 
are not true spite cases. Although no cases were found that involved spite 
as cleanly as that in Benkowski, it is clear that a number of jurisdictions 
have broad enough parameters for what would constitute a tortious 
breach deserving of punitive damages to accommodate spiteful 
behavior.136 
One Maryland court is particularly on point in this regard. 
Accordingly, “[w]hen a tort is alleged to arise out of a contractual 
relationship, actual malice is the essential prerequisite to the recovery of 
punitive damages.”137 Actual malice means the purpose is “to deliberately 
and willfully injure the plaintiff.”138 Similarly a Mississippi court notes that 
 
130 Frank J. Cavico, Jr., Punitive Damages for Breach of Contract: A Principled Approach, 
22 ST. MARY’S L.J. 357, 445 (1990). 
131 Id. at 448. 
132 Id. 
133 Id. at 447. 
134 To identify these cases the following search was conducted using Westlaw: 
“tortious breach” /p “punitive damages and any of the following terms: spite, malice, 
oppression, “actual malice.” 
135 In addition, “tortious breach” did not always refer to breach of contract.  
136 See, e.g., Rodriguez v. Wells Fargo Bank, Inc., No. 2:15-cv-01303-KJM-CMK, 
2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 119327, at *28–29 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 2, 2016); Quality Auto. Co. v. 
Signet Bank/Md., 775 F. Supp. 849, 853 (D. Md. 1991); L.L. Cole & Son, Inc. v. 
Hickman, 665 S.W.2d 278, 282–283 (Ark. 1984) (dissent); Cohen v. Sterling, No. 
B247899, 2015 Cal. App. LEXIS 1952, at *33 (Ct. App. Cal. Mar. 17, 2015); Willard v. 
Paracelsus Health Care Corp., 681 So.2d 539, 543 (Miss. 1996). 
137 Quality Auto. Co., 775 F. Supp. at 853. 
138 Id. (quoting Drug Fair of Md., Inc. v. Smith, 283 A.2d 392 (Ct. App. Md. 
1971)). 
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“punitive damages [based on tortious breach of contract] are recoverable 
for breach of contract when such breach is attended by intentional 
wrong, insult, abuse or . . . gross negligence.”139 Despite this language, a 
close look at the cases did not reveal any instances in which the courts 
identified spite, as defined here, as the basis for punitive damages when 
liability was based on tortious breach of contract. There is an element of 
consistency here. In a sense, those who breach contracts are strictly 
liable. Except in the narrow group of instances in which performance is 
excused due to unforeseen circumstances, damages are paid. Courts do 
not tend to assess the motivation for a breach, and in so doing, also treat 
most breaching parties alike.140  
 A pattern of finding punitive damages appropriate in cases of spite 
(or actual malice) is present in tortious interference cases. The cases 
here, though, are a bit muddled. In some instances, spite or actual malice 
is required to establish a case of tortious interference.141 In other 
instances, spite or actual malice is critical only in the award of punitive 
damages.142 But even with respect to punitive damages, courts are not 
consistent in what is required. For example, in Banks v. Mario Industries of 
Virginia, Inc., sales agents for an 80-year-old firm set up a new firm as a 
competitor.143 They did this while still employed by the plaintiff firm and 
made use of confidential records of that firm. The lower court awarded 
punitive damages and the Virginia Supreme Court upheld the decision. 
The defendants argued there was no showing of “malice, willfulness, or 
wantonness[,]” and thus, punitive damages were unwarranted.144 The 
 
139 Willard, 681 So.2d at 543. 
140 The entire inquiry into the possibility of cases arising from contracts also 
resulting in punitive damages is difficult because of the dual use of spite. Specifically, 
if spite-like actions result in crossing the borderline from contract to tort, can they 
also be used to assess punitive damages? It seems like they must be, but the dearth of 
cases that mention spite in the context of tortious interference makes this assessment 
impossible. 
141 KEETON, supra note 71, at 984. See, e.g., Mountain States Pipe & Supply Co. v. 
City of New Roads, La., No. 12-2146, 2013 WL 3199724, at *3 (E.D. La. 2013); 
Powderly v. MetraByte Corp., 866 F. Supp. 39, 43 (D. Mass. 1994); Skaskiw v. Vermont 
Agency of Agric., 112 A.3d 1277, 1288 (Vt. 2014). 
142 See, e.g., Lawyers Title Co. v. Kingdom Title Sol.’s, Inc., 592 F. App’x 345, 353 
(6th Cir. 2014); Zimmerman v. Direct Fed. Credit Union, 262 F.3d 70, 81 (1st Cir. 
2001); Bullet Express, Inc. v. New Way Logistics, Inc., 70 N.E.3d 251, 266 (Ill. App. Ct. 
2016); Alexander & Alexander v. B. Dixon Evander & Assoc., Inc., 650 A.2d 260, 269 
(Md. 1994). In Zimmerman, the court assessed the level of maliciousness under the 
steps provided by the Supreme Court in BMW of N. Am. v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 
(1996). (In particular the Gore Court noted that a critical factor was the degree of 
reprehensibility of the conduct.). 
143 650 S.E.2d 687 (Va. 2007). 
144 Id. at 700.  
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Court rejected the argument evidently equating the purpose of 
competing and the resulting injury to the plaintiffs as malicious.145  
This can be compared with a Texas case, in Clements v. Withers,146 
which arguably has a higher standard for punitive damages.  
Actual malice need not be shown to recover compensatory damages 
for the tort of interference with an existing contractual 
relationship. Intentional and knowing interference must be shown, 
but there may be liability even though the interferor’s motive be to 
save money for himself or another. On the other hand, to support 
the recovery of punitive damages in such a case, there must be a 
finding of actual malice: ill-will, spite, evil motive, or purposing the 
injuring of another.147 
Aside from torts arising out of contractual relations, there is one 
remaining possible avenue for courts to respond to spite—by allowing 
recovery for mental suffering when there is a breach of contract. In some 
sense there seems to be a logical connection here. After all, spiteful 
behavior is actually designed to have a negative impact on the emotional 
well-being of the victim. This is not the direction the law has taken, at 
least not directly. Ordinarily, contract damages are not available for 
mental suffering.148 These would be consequential damages, and 
therefore, subject to both foreseeability and certainty of amount 
limitations.149 According to the Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 
“[r]ecovery for emotional disturbance will be excluded unless the breach 
also caused bodily harm or the contract or the breach is of such a kind 
that serious emotional disturbance was a particularly likely result.”150  
Spitefulness looks to the intention of the breaching party in 
breaching the contract. Instead, as the Restatement reflects, the issue is 
less along the lines of the state of mind of the breaching party and more 
along the lines of whether the type of breach could be expected to result 
in significant mental suffering regardless of any specific ill-will of the 
defendant. The exclusion of damages for mental suffering is not 
absolute.151 For example, even in a commercial context, buyers of onion 
seeds that turned out to be defective recovered damages for emotional 
 
145 Id.  
146 Clements v. Withers, 437 S.W.2d 818, 822 (Tex. 1969). See also Compuspa, Inc. 
v. Int’l Bus. Mach. Corp., 228 F. Supp. 2d 613, 627 (D. Md. 2002). 
147 Clements, 437 S.W.2d at 822 (emphasis added). Even there, though, the court 
observed that actual malice may not be required in cases of fraud. Id.  
148 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 840 (3d ed. 1999); 3 RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). 
149 24 SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 64:7 (4th ed. 
2001). See, e.g., Sheely v. MRI Radiology Network, P.A., 505 F.3d 1173, 1200 (11th Cir. 
2007). 
150 RESTATEMENT, supra note 148, at § 353. 
151 Sheely, 505 F.3d at 1200. 
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distress when their farm was forced into bankruptcy.152 Plus, the 
restriction does not apply to cases that cross the borderline into tort 
where damages for mental suffering are available. Nevertheless, it is rare 
to find that the spitefulness of the defendant plays a role in awarding 
damages for mental suffering.  
One example of this rarity is Cabaness v. Thomas,153 a Utah Supreme 
Court case. The plaintiff, a discharged employee, brought an action 
based on “harassment, intimidation and abuse” in the workplace.154 
Defendants were granted summary judgment. On appeal, the court held 
that recovery based on mental suffering was permitted based on a 
contract theory. According to the court, such damages were recoverable 
when they were both “a foreseeable result of the breach of contract and 
explicitly within the contemplation of the parties at the time the contract 
was entered into.”155 Somewhat similarly, a court has permitted damages 
for mental suffering when the display of plaintiff’s photograph (in 
violation of the contract) was deemed to be malicious.156 Very little, if 
anything, should be inferred from these cases. Although the hurtful 
intent of the actor might well exist in instances in which mental suffering 
is the basis for recovery, it is not at all clear that there is a causal 
connection.  
C. Facilitation of Positional Goods 
As a general matter, current law does little to discourage positional 
externalities resulting from the consumption of positional goods. The 
two areas of law that are most relevant are tax and trademark. Tax law 
has the capacity to lower positional spending and does so, in a minor way, 
by the application of a progressive income tax. Trademark, as currently 
applied, encourages it by allowing trademarks to be used as symbols of 
status and wealth.  
 
152 Lutz Farms v. Asgrow Seed Co., 948 F.2d 638, 643 (10th Cir. 1991). 
153 Cabaness v. Thomas, 232 P.3d 486, 486 (Utah 2010). For a differing approach, 
see Riggs v. MySpace, Inc., No. CV 09-03073-GHK (CTx), 2009 WL 10671689, at *5 
(C.D. Cal. 2009); Rodrigues v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, No. 3:08-CV-1417(PCD), 
2009 WL 3710688, at *4 (D. Conn. 2009); Stokes v. Charleston Cty Sch. Dist., No. C.A. 
2:05-CV-02970-DCN, 2007 WL 858864, at *7 (D. S.C. 2007). 
154 Cabaness, 232 P.3d at 492. 
155 Id. at 508. 
156 McCreery v. Miller’s Grocerteria Co., 64 P.2d 803, 805 (Colo. 1937). See also 
Trimble v. City & Cty. of Denver, 697 P.2d 716, 730 (Colo. 1985). 
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1. Tax Policy 
For generations proposals have existed to curb rivalrous spending.157 
It is tempting to think of a luxury tax as having the greatest potential for 
lowering the level of position spending.158 By taxing the purchase of 
yachts, expensive cars, and jewelry at higher rates, the level of 
consumption is reduced. This is because demand for luxury goods is 
viewed as relatively elastic.159 There are two problems, however, with a 
luxury tax as a means of controlling positional spending. First, since the 
demand for any one positional good is elastic, people interested in 
positional goods may simply switch to ones on which the tax is not 
imposed. Second, some goods are subject to a “Veblen effect,”160 which 
means as their price goes up they actually become more attractive as 
positional goods.161 At the extreme, higher prices, at least in theory, could 
lead to increases in the quantity demanded. Consequently, a luxury tax is 
probably not an effective response to positional spending.  
The challenge, then, is to structure a tax system that more or less 
penalizes all positional spending. This seems to call for a progressive tax 
on consumption. The leading modern proponent of such system is 
economist Robert Frank, who has published widely on the issues raised 
by positional spending.162 He follows, however, the example of 
philosophers and economists ranging from Hume to Milton Friedman.163 
The system would work like this. Suppose your income was $300,000. You 
might save $20,000 and the rest (the amount used for consumption) 
above a certain amount and with possible deductions, would be subject to 
a progressive tax. Thus, your consumption above $200,000 might be 
taxed at 20%. Consumption above $300,000 might be taxed at 25% and 
 
157 See FRANK, supra note 60, at 223–24. For a history of the consumption tax, see 
Arthur Cockfield, Income Taxes and Individual Liberty: A Lockean Perspective on Radical 
Consumption Tax Reform, 46 S. D. L. REV. 8, 33–34 (2001). 
158 The Unites States experimented with a luxury tax in the period 1990–1993. It 
was a tax on automobiles, yachts, furs, jewelry, and aircraft that had a price above a 
certain amount. Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1990 Pub. L. No. 101-508 §§ 4001–
4007, 104 Stat. 1388, 439–42 (repealed 2002). 
159 Because demand curves slope downward, an increase in the price of an item 
typically leads to a decrease in quality demanded. Elasticity refers to the percentage 
change in price as compared to the percentage change in quantity demanded. If 
demand is elastic, the percentage change in quantity demand is higher than the 
percentage change in price. Price Elasticity of Demand, INVESTOPEDIA, https://www. 
investopedia.com/terms/p/priceelasticity.asp. 
160 This is a reference to Thornstein Veblen, to whom the term “conspicuous 
consumption” is attributed. See Laurie Simon Bagwell & B. Douglas Bernheim, Veblen 
Effects in a Theory of Conspicuous Consumption, 86 AM. ECON. REV. 349, 349 (1996). 
161 See Mason, supra note 45, at 125. 
162 See supra notes 11, 44, 45, & 47. 
163 FRANK, supra note 60, at 223. See generally NICHOLAS KALDOR, AN EXPENDITURE 
TAX 11 (1955); Cockfield, supra note 157. 
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so on. Frank believes that the system would be successful in curbing 
spending because it leaves everyone in the same relative position. He puts 
it like this: “In a society with a progressive consumption tax, the 
wealthiest drivers might buy a Porsche 911 Turbo for $150,000 rather 
than a Ferrari Berlinetta F12 for more than twice that amount. But since 
everyone would be scaling back, that society’s Porsche owners would be 
just as excited about their cars as Ferrari owners are under the current 
tax system.”164 
In theory, a consumption tax would likely have a huge impact on 
spending that is ultimately intended to diminish others by virtue of 
demonstrating or signaling superiority. There are, however, detractors.165 
For example, there are questions about whether the tax could ever be 
passed with levels of progressivity that would make a difference.166 
Moreover, the notion that expenditures must be taxed because of the 
negative effect they have on others is not one that appeals politically.167 
There is also an underlying empirical question of how serious relative 
consumption is.168 Regardless of these reservations, as far as current U.S. 
tax policy, it clearly falls short of the optimal policy to curtail positional 
consumption. 
2. Trademark 
While tax policy can be viewed as neutral with respect to positional 
consumption, trademark law is nothing less than a method of subsidizing 
it. Normally we think of trademark law as a method of avoiding confusion 
by providing information to buyers in the marketplace. A certain label or 
mark carries with it information about the quality of the product. The 
terms “Rolex” and “McDonalds” in their own ways tell a story. The 
problem is that trademarks can carry two stories. One is about the 
product and one is about the person possessing the product. When it 
communicates about the buyer, the two most relevant types of 
information have been called snob effects and Veblen effects.169 The snob 
effect occurs when consumer demand is influenced by a desire to 
 
164 ROBERT H. FRANK, SUCCESS AND LUCK: GOOD FORTUNE AND THE MYTH OF 
MERITOCRACY 119 (2016). 
165 A good summary of objections is found in Cockfield, supra note 157, at 66–68. 
See also Alvin Warren, Would a Consumption Tax Be Fairer than an Income Tax?, 89 YALE 
L.J. 1081, 1096–97 (1980); David R. Henderson, Robert Frank’s Strange Case for Taxing 
‘The Rich,’ CATO (Nov./Dec. 2007), https://www.cato.org/policy-report/ 
novemberdecember-2007/robert-franks-strange-case-taxing-rich. 
166 FRANK, supra note 60, at 225. 
167 Id.  
168 Henderson, supra note 165. 
169 Harvey Leibenstein, Bandwagon, Snob, and Veblen Effects in the Theory of 
Consumers’ Demand, 64 Q.J. ECON. 183, 189 (1950). Leibenstein also identifies 
“bandwagon effects” in which consumer demand is influenced by a desire to go along 
with the crowd. 
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distinguish oneself. The idea is to signal a different set, and presumably 
superior set of tastes.170 Veblen goods, on the other hand, are associated 
with what is normally called conspicuous consumption, and the 
attraction can be the price itself.171 The two concepts can merge at times; 
very expensive items can be believed to be associated with snobbery and 
standing out from the crowd in terms of one’s taste. Nevertheless, the key 
ingredient in these cases is something that identifies the good in the eyes 
of observers—often this means trademark is critical to signaling. 
This type of signaling is quite different from the signaling that is 
meant to convey information about product quality and to lower 
transaction costs yet it seems to be part of modern mainstream trademark 
law.172 For example, in Mastercrafters Clock and Radio Company v. Vacheron 
& Constatin-Le Watches, Inc.173 the manufacturer of a relatively expensive 
clock challenged the manufacturers of a significantly less expensive copy. 
The appellate court reversed the lower court and endorsed status 
signaling:  
[P]laintiff copied the design of the Atmos clock because plaintiff 
intended to, and did, attract purchasers who wanted a “luxury 
design” clock. This goes to show at least that some customers would 
buy plaintiff’s cheaper clock for the purpose of acquiring the 
prestige gained by displaying what many visitors at the customers’ 
homes would regard as a prestigious article. Plaintiff’s wrong thus 
consisted of the fact that such a visitor would be likely to assume 
that the clock was an Atmos clock.174 
 
170 Id.; Jeffrey L. Harrison, Trademark Law and Status Signaling: Tattoos for the 
Privileged, 59 FLA. L. REV. 195, 207 (2007). 
171 Leibenstein, supra note 169, at 189. For an empirical examination of 
signaling, see Angela Chao & Juliet B. Schor, Empirical Tests of Status Consumption: 
Evidence from Women’s Cosmetics, 19 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 107, 109 (1998). See also Bagwell 
& Bernheim, supra note 160, at 349 (examining situations where “Veblen effects” 
arise from the desire to gain social status by conspicuous consumption to signal 
wealth); Robert L. Basmann et al., A Note on Measuring Veblen’s Theory of Conspicuous 
Consumption, 70 REV. ECON. & STAT. 531, 531 (1988). 
172 See generally Harrison, supra note 170, at 227; Jeremy N. Sheff, Veblen Brands, 96 
MINN. L. REV. 769 (2012). See also Jonathan M. Barnett, Shopping for Gucci on Canal 
Street: Reflections on Status Consumption, Intellectual Property, and the Incentive Thesis, 91 
VA. L. REV. 1381, 1386 (2005). Although status signaling was endorsed before this 
time, it is noteworthy that the Lanham Act was amended in 1962. Prior to that time it 
covered instances in which confusion might be caused to “purchasers as to the source 
of original . . . goods or services.” The 1962 amendments dropped the word 
“purchasers.” Lanham Act, Pub. L. No. 87-772, sec. 11, § 16, 76 Stat. 769, 771 (1962) 
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1114 (2006)). 
173 Mastercrafters Clock and Radio Co. v. Vacheron & Constatin-Le Coultre 
Watches, Inc., 221 F.2d 464, 467 (2d Cir. 1955) (decided on the basis of unfair 
competition). 
174 Id. at 466. 
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The same sentiment is found in a more recent case concerning 
knock-offs of the so-called “Kelly Bag.”175 The lower court focused on 
confusion by purchasers and noted that any confusion would be dealt 
with at the point of sale.176 In effect, there was no harm to the public. The 
Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, finding that that there was an 
infringement by those making knock-offs.177 According to the court, “a 
loss occurs when a sophisticated buyer purchases a knockoff and passes it 
off to the public as the genuine article, thereby confusing the viewing 
public and achieving the status of owning the genuine article at a 
knockoff price.”178 
Finally, Judge Kozinski has weighed in with his own defense of the 
public investment in promoting Veblen effects. In the context of the 
Rolex watch he argues: Allowing the copies to exist is “a pure loss” 
because it “will make it less likely that Rolex . . . and others will invest in 
image advertising, denying the image-conscious among us something we hold 
near and dear.”179 Judge Kozinski does not explain why the fact that people 
value status should result in a public investment to maintain vanity.180  
One can debate the proper role of trademark law but there is little 
or no basis to believe this area of American law does anything other than 
incentivize positional consumption and the underlying spiteful 
underpinnings. One question this Article addresses is whether United 
States law is sufficiently nuanced to permit spitefulness when it is, like in 
the ultimatum game, a protest against injustice.181 At least in the context 
of trademark law, this question is moot. It is not clear how justice seeking 
in the context of conspicuous consumption would manifest itself.  
 
175 Hermes Int’l v. Lederer De Paris Fifth Ave., Inc. 219 F.3d 104 (2d Cir. 2000). 
The Kelly Bag is made by Hermes. Its value skyrocketed when Princess Grace of 
Monaco was spotted carrying one in the mid 1950s. Today Kelly Bag prices can 
exceed $10,000. Hermes 32 cm Kelly Capucine Bag, BAGHUNTER, https://baghunter. 
com/products/hermes-kelly-32-capucine-ghw. See generally, Harrison, supra note 170 at 
201 n.27. 
176 Hermes Int’l v. Lederer De Paris Fifth Ave., Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 212, 226 
(S.D.N.Y. 1999). 
177 Hermes Int’l., 219 F.3d at 110; see also Payless Shoesource, Inc. v. Reebok Int’l 
Ltd., 998 F.2d 985, 989 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Polo Fashions, Inc. v. Craftex, Inc., 816 F.2d 
145, 148 (4th Cir. 1987). 
178 Hermes Int’l., 219 F.3d at 109. 
179 Alex Kozinski, Trademarks Unplugged, 68 N.Y.U. L. REV. 960, 970 (1993) 
(emphasis added).  
180 For an argument that there is no economic or moral basis for an investment 
in status signaling, see Harrison, supra note 170, at 227. For a different view, see 
Shahar J. Dilbary, Famous Trademarks and the Rational Basis for “Irrational Beliefs”, 14 
GEO. MASON L. REV. 605, 605 (2007). 
181 See supra text accompanying notes 21–38. 
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D. Criminal Law 
Does spite play a role in criminal punishment? This is a difficult 
question, in part, because there are two perspectives to adopt. One can 
ask whether the general deterrence function of criminal law deters some 
actions that are spite-based. Almost certainly it does. There are many 
crimes in which the satisfaction of the perpetrator is directly related to 
the disutility of the victim. Hate crimes fit this description, as do rape and 
various instances of cruelty to people and animals.182 The fact that assaults 
and batteries are more harshly punished if they are “aggravated” lends 
some support to this as well.183  
In particular when it comes to harms to people, as opposed to 
property, it makes sense to have enhanced penalties. This is a broad 
statement to make, and it is impossible to say whether crimes to persons 
are more severely punished than crimes to property, because there is no 
standard for comparison. Still, spite-motivated crimes are quite different 
from property crimes. As noted earlier,184 at least one theory for 
punishing theft and perhaps other crimes involving property is that we 
would like to channel those activities into the market. One could think of 
punishment as the price one pays for bypassing the market.185 If the price 
is high enough, a market transaction becomes more attractive. In the 
case of spite, there can be no market transaction—there is no gain to the 
spiteful person if there is consent.186 The theory and several examples 
suggest that criminal law does attempt to some degree to deter spiteful 
conduct. 
 The other perspective is whether criminal law exists as a reflection 
of our own spite. As a starting point, consider the generally accepted 
rationales for punishment: rehabilitation, deterrence, incapacitation, 
retribution.187 It seems doubtful that those who determine the 
 
182 For express considerations of spite see, e.g., U.S. v. Diamond, 65 M.J. 876, 892 
(A. Ct. Crim. App. 2007); B.A.L. v. Apple, No. 00-0068-C-B/G, 2001 WL 1135024, at 
*7 n.4 (S.D. Ind. 2001); People v. Gomez-Perez, No. C056219, 2009 WL 795289, at 
*12 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009); Klokoc v. Florida, 589 So.2d 219, 219 (Fla. 1991); 
Commonwealth v. Tanzer, No. 096-P-902, 2010 WL 1539860 at *1 (Mass. App. Ct. 
2010); North Carolina v. Forest, 362 S.E.2d 252, 255 (N.C. 1987); Tennessee v. 
Carlton, No. W2009-01004-CCA-RD-CD, 2010 WL 571798, at *4 (Tenn. Crim. App. 
2010).  
183 See, e.g., Young v. Florida, 753 So. 2d 725, 727 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000); 
Moakley v. Florida, 547 So .2d 1246, 1247 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989); State v. Lutz, 113 
N.E.2d 757, 758 (Ohio C.P. 1953). 
184 See supra text accompanying notes 61–66. 
185 This price is in terms of expected punishment, which is the probability of 
apprehension and conviction times the actual penalty.  
186 For a discussion, see Ciraolo v. City of New York, 216 F.3d 236, 246 n.8 (2d 
Cir. 2000) (Calabresi concurring). 
187 Christopher Adams Thorn, Retribution Exclusive of Deterrence: An Insufficient 
Justification for Capital Punishment, 57 S. CAL. L. REV. 199, 200 (1983). 
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appropriate level of punishment for deterrence are motivated by spite.188 
Nor does it seem that spite can explain incapacitation or rehabilitation. It 
is not that these are not costly to society nor that they are not aimed to 
achieve specific goals. The problem is that they are designed to 
accomplish goals that accrue to the benefit of society. It is true that 
someone may feel gratified to know someone else is suffering, but none 
of these future-looking goals seem to have spite as an underlying rational.  
As defined here, it is retribution that appears to be akin to spite; all 
we get out of it is the satisfaction that others will suffer. This would be, 
however, a utilitarian perspective, and for the most part, retribution is 
not viewed as having a utilitarian basis. In this vein, John Cottingham 
writes about “Varieties of Retribution”189 of which he says there are no less 
than nine. One he labels “satisfaction theory,” which he defines as: “A 
man is rightly punished because his punishment bring satisfaction to 
others.” 190 In effect, “there should be some kind of reciprocity between 
the sense of grievance felt by the victim . . . and the satisfaction he gets 
from the suffering of the offender.”191 Cottingham rejects this view of 
retribution first, because it involves interpersonal comparisons of utility, 
and second, because it is fundamentally utilitarian in that it is “a 
mechanism for the prevention of vendettas” which makes society better 
off.192  
Rawls also captures this non-instrumental view of retribution: “What 
we may call the retributive view is that punishment is justified on the 
grounds that wrongdoing merits punishment. It is morally fitting that a 
person who does wrong should suffer in proportion to his wrongdoing 
. . . . The state of affairs where a wrongdoer suffers punishment is morally 
better than the state of affairs where he does not . . . .”193 He goes on to 
contrast this with the utilitarian view whereby punishment is dependent 
on the net beneficial consequences for society.194  
Finally, the idea is beautifully expressed by Kant:  
Even if a civil society were dissolved through the unanimous vote of 
its members (e.g., if an island society decided to dissolve with its 
members spreading themselves over the rest of the earth), the last 
murderer within its prison first must be executed so that he 
experiences what his own deeds are worth and the bloodguilt does 
 
188 For a possibly dissenting view, see James Fitzjames Stephen, History of 
Criminal Law in England 81 (1883) cited in, Stanley C. Brubaker, Can Liberals 
Punish?, 82 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 821, 824 (1988). 
189 John Cottingham, Varieties of Retribution, 29 PHIL. Q. 238, 238 (1979). 
190 Id. at 241. 
191 Id. at 242.  
192 Id. See also Richard A. Posner, Retribution and Related Concepts of Punishment, 9 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 71, 71–72 (1980). 
193 John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 4–5 (1955). 
194 Id. at 5. 
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not cling to the society that did not insist on this punishment: since, 
if so, it can be seen as having participated in that public violation of 
justice.195 
 The point is that there are utilitarian reasons—rehabilitation, 
incapacitation, deterrence—for punishment which seem to have little or 
nothing to do with spitefulness of those imposing the punishment. On 
the other hand, while we may feel better about a system in which 
wrongdoers are punished without regard for the any identifiable social 
benefit, this purpose of punishment similarly cannot easily be tied to 
spite as it is defined here. Indeed, underlying much of criminal law and 
procedure seems to be a desire to filter out the spiteful inclinations of 
victims. As an example, consider the burglaries of two homes while the 
occupants are away. In one case, the victims are distraught and their hate 
for the thief so powerful they would like personal revenge and would feel 
no remorse afterward. Their feelings of spite are so overwhelming they 
would be willing to violate the law and suffer the consequences as long as 
the thief is made to suffer. The occupants of the other house are upset 
but take it in stride. They hate that it happened but feel no hatred toward 
the thief. Everything else being equal, the two thieves will be treated alike 
regardless of spiteful feelings.  
IV.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS  
Spite is not a simple concept. Some actions are motivated by a desire 
to harm others as a source of the actor’s satisfaction. Those same actions 
may be a reaction to a personal sense of injustice. Finally, spite-like 
actions are consistent with simply righting a wrong. This Article makes 
the case that spite, in its worst from, is comparable to theft. It is a taking 
of someone’s sense of wellbeing without consent. This Article also claims 
that the purchase of positional goods is ultimately spite driven. It 
canvasses tort law, contracts, tax law, trademark, and criminal law in an 
effort to assess the reaction of the law to spite.  
Because spite is a form of theft, it is not surprising to find that the 
strongest reactions are in tort law, and to some extent, criminal law. Both 
are applied in a way to deter spiteful actions. In tort law this means a 
greater likelihood of punitive damages. In criminal law it may be 
enhanced punishment. Contract law has yet to develop any coherent 
reaction to spite and such a development seems unlikely. Interestingly, 
tax policy falls well short of its potential in terms of curbing spite and 
trademark law actually subsidizes it. Although there is evidence in 
sociology and psychology that some spite is relatively benign or even 
socially beneficial, there is little indication that the law has any 
 
195 B. Sharon Byrd, Kant’s Theory of Punishment: Deterrence in its Threat, Retribution 
in its Execution, 8 LAW & PHIL. 151, 151 (1989). 
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predictable way to distinguish these instances from ordinary self-
regarding spite.  
 
